The Collateral of the Rising Public Diplomacy in Turkey: The Presidency of Religious Affairs and the Religious Diplomacy

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Abstract

It has been widely discussed whether Turkish foreign policy has been changing since the Justice and Development Party (AKP hereafter) came into power in 2002. Among the new concepts which signal a probable change in the foreign policy, “public diplomacy” seems to be a significant one considering that AKP has even founded the Office of Public Diplomacy in 2010 within the Turkish Prime Ministry. Public diplomacy, the task of serving national interests through influencing foreign states’ peoples, winning their hearts and minds, instrumentalizes a state’s traits and is carried by many public institutions. Religion is one of the cultural traits of a state which serves public diplomacy with its binding influence on public. For a few decades, the terms “religious diplomacy”, “inter-religious diplomacy” or “faith diplomacy” have been used to indicate the positive impact of religion on diplomacy, especially on “public diplomacy” which addresses public rather than the traditional diplomatic institutions.

Religious diplomacy has mainly two meanings. On the one hand, it means establishing an interreligious dialogue between states and their societies. On the other hand, it implies promoting religiously based relations with other states and their societies sharing the same religion. In Turkey, the Presidency of Religious Affairs is the main carrier of religious diplomacy as it has started be expressed by the Presidency itself. A closer look at the campaigns and policies of the Presidency especially in the Balkans, Africa and the Middle East in the last decade shows that it complements the government’s public diplomacy establishing religious ties with the states especially which have Muslim populations. The Presidency is organizing humanitarian aid campaigns for Muslims suffering all around the world while participating in the ones the government organizes. In press releases, The Presidency addresses all people and all international organizations to free the Muslims from poverty, injustice and violence. It also regulates the education of the religious personnel who are to work outside of the Turkish borders. The Presidency organizes international programs for those willing to “construct a future based on their cultural origins” and “satisfy the religious, cultural, social and psychological needs of the Muslims with their knowledge on Islamic theology.” Looking at the campaigns, press releases, international programs, conferences, seminars and the discourse used in these, the paper tries to show how the Presidency cooperates with the government serving public diplomacy.

In this presentation, the aim is to stress the contribution of The Presidency of Religious Affairs to the public diplomacy especially in the last decade. It can be easily observed that aid campaigns for Muslim populations outside of the border have become a major divisive issue and divided the Turkish population into two as the ones willing to help poor Muslim people for the sake of God and/or humanity and the ones criticizing this argument insisting that Turkey has itself helpless people inside of its own borders. The motivation of the presentation is to point out the insufficiency of the discussion whether AKP unnecessarily engages with Muslim populations outside of the Turkish borders. For a few decades, public diplomacy and religious diplomacy as its complementary have been crucial tools in
international relations, and analyzing the AKP’s partaking in humanitarian campaigns outside the borders without taking this viewpoint into consideration would be fall short.

Therefore, the presentation intends to remark that The Presidency of Religious Affairs with the religious diplomacy it carries has also been an element in international relations for a while and analysis on AKP’s foreign policy should also pay attention to this religious diplomacy dimension as a part of public diplomacy strategy.

**Keywords:** Public Diplomacy, Religious Diplomacy, The Presidency of Religious Affairs, The Justice and Development Party (AKP), Foreign Policy democracy.

**Introduction**

It is a common conviction that the states are not the only actors in international relations anymore. New actors are eager to take part in international relations while the old sole state has been transforming and learning to get along well with the new actors. The Presidency of Religious Affairs (DIB) is one of these new actors which has been working closely connected with the implementation of the Turkish foreign policy since the AKP era began. DIB is so active in international arena that Mehmet Görmez, the President of DIB, stated that a religious diplomacy was born recently. The paper will at first mention the new concepts which make the new actors’ emergence possible, namely the public diplomacy and soft power. Then it will be showed how DIB acts in parallel with the AKP’s understanding of foreign policy and international relations. It will therefore be argued that the role of DIB as an actor in Turkish foreign policy should be analyzed in detail and taken into consideration to understand AKP’s foreign policy.

**The New Comrades Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, and Their Religious Supporter**

Public diplomacy is “an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public”, while traditional diplomacy is “an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with another international actor” (Cull, 2009, p. 12). This definition of Nicholas Cull, who is a leading scholar working on public diplomacy, raises questions on the nature of being an international actor, the nature of the international environment, the nature of an “attempt” and “engagement” and so on. All these concepts have been changing in a way that embracing a wider space in international relations. The beginning of this change can be dated back to the end of the Cold War, an era which transformed the international system and introduced new concepts, actors and visions on how international politics have been conducted. The paper does not aim to scan all aspects of this transformation since the late 1980s but intends to focus on one comprehensive notion which paves the way for the formulation and application of public diplomacy.

“Soft power”, as Joseph Nye coined the term in 1990 and described in detail in 2004, is “the second face of power” which does not differ in the final goal but in means comparing hard power. According to Nye, soft power is the ability to set the agenda and attract the others in world politics to convince them that they want the outcomes that you want.
Shaping the people’s preferences winning their hearts and minds, soft power uses a different currency than force or money to engender cooperation—“an attraction to shared values and the justness and the duty of contributing to the achievement of those values” (Nye, 2004, p. 5-7). A state has three main resources to become a soft power which are cultural values, political values and the foreign policies which are seen legitimate and having moral authority (p. 11). Then public diplomacy is obviously a mechanism that serves a soft power to convince the other societies that the cultural and political values of that power are desirable for all and therefore its foreign policies should be supported.

Religion is one of the cultural values of a state that can be used to create a dialogue with the foreign societies. Religious diplomacy, faith diplomacy or inter-religious diplomacy as used in the literature, has the potential of both influencing the people sharing the same religion and at the same time promoting an interreligious dialogue which may surpass some political problems. For a well-known scholar Douglas Johnston, religious diplomacy is, just like a trump card, “a key resource to be used at the opportune moment”. While it signifies the end of a period of narrow power politics in which religious factors have intentionally being excluded from policy maker’s calculus, it also suggests a new goal for realist politics which is to understand how religion shapes the worldviews and political aspirations of others (2003, p. xi-xii). It should also be mentioned that behind the rising of the religious facet of public diplomacy, the common assessment that there is “a resurgence of religion” in world plays a vital role. The signals that religion is coming back to the societies and so to the politics directed the policy makers to analyze and produce policies to live with it. Considering that AKP, a party which is known for its Islamic past and which describes itself as conservative, openly sympathizes with the Ottoman Empire, religious diplomacy as a rising value in international relations offers critical opportunities for AKP to conduct a timely foreign policy.

The Turkish Case: A Conservative Government Wants to Make Turkey a Soft Power and Calls the Presidency of Religious Affairs for Help

Public diplomacy is a recent notion in Turkey which in fact came into question with the foundation of the Office of Public Diplomacy (Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü, KDK hereafter) in 2010 within the Turkish Prime Ministry. KDK describes its mission as to increase Turkey’s visibility and efficiency in international public opinion and to coordinate governmental and non-governmental organizations to improve Turkey’s reputation. KDK actively organizes meetings, conferences, seminars, workshops etc. in the fields such as science and technology, foreign aids, economy, higher education, tourism, culture, art, media, and strengthens Turkey’s communication with the world (Hedefler, 2010). It is not a coincidence that the KDK was established during the AKP government whose foreign policy has been discussed a lot inside Turkey mostly on the basis of the new terminology that Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, introduced. Although the aim of the paper is not to discuss AKP’s foreign policy in detail, it is a must to indicate that the vision

1 In this paper, inter-religious aspect of religious diplomacy is not included. The main motivation of the paper is to look at the DIB’s activities towards the Muslims. Yet, the project of “Alliance of Civilizations”, a key dimension of AKP’s foreign policy, is a perfect example of inter-religious diplomacy.

and the mission of the KDK is closely connected to the vision and mission of AKP, which is to make Turkey a global but soft power\(^3\).

KDK does not actually make a direct reference to the DIB. Yet vision of AKP’s foreign policy and the KDK clearly shows that the DIB has a unique role as the religious body of a future soft power\(^4\). According to Görmez, the effects of religious values have been increasing all over the world and a “religious diplomacy” was born. There are now ties between all religious bodies and these ties have started to affect the future of the societies. Therefore it is a must for DIB to give religious education and service outside of Turkey (Diyanet İşleri Başkanı Görmez’den Çarpıcı Tespit, 2012).

DIB is one of the main team-mates of KDK in almost all foreign organizations. The foreign service team generally includes KDK, DIB, Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanı Başkanlığı, TİKA), Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akıba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, YTB) and Kızılay. Representatives of these institutions conduct joint humanitarian aid and development campaigns in especially Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and Africa. DIB also works with another strategic institution of public diplomacy which is Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) since 2012. TRT and DIB signed a protocol to start the broadcasting of a new channel, TRT Diyanet TV (TRT Diyanet TV Ramazan Ayında Yayında, 2012).

In addition it is possible to see that DIB and other state/government institutions organize joint conferences and organizations, and they host one another in a way that they give each other an opportunity to express their own point of view. For instance it is not a surprise to observe that Erdoğan, The Prime Minister, makes the opening speech in the Second African Muslim Religious Leaders Summit which DIB hosts. In his speech that he started with besmele (in the name of God) he mentioned the brotherhood of Turkey and Africa, the common history and civilization, cooperation and affection between two communities etc (İslamofobia Lanetlenmesi Gereken Bir Suçtur, 2012). Moreover, the President of DIB usually accompanies Erdoğan and other party members in their visits to abroad for humanitarian campaigns, for the openings of places such as mosques and student dormitories, for iftars (the breaking of the fast) in Ramadan, for contributing conflict resolution where needed etc. For example, the President of DIB was in the group of officials who went to Indonesia after the tsunami. His presence was needed, with the words of Erdoğan, to be able to evaluate the moral aspect of the disaster (Başbakan Erdoğan Tsunami FelaketininYaşandığı Güney Asya’ya Gitti, 2005).

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\(^4\) DIB was established in 1924. According to the Article 136 of 1982 Constitution, “The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which takes place in the general administration,is responsible for the execution of the duties specified in the special law inorder to provide national unity and solidarity, and remain separate from allpolitical views and thoughts in accordance with the principle of secularism.” The article “About the Presidency of Religious Affairs, its Establishment and Obligations” states the DIB’s duties and responsibilities as follows: “to execute the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam, enlighten the public about their religion, and administer the sacred worshipping places.” Basic Principles, Aims and Objectives. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. (2013). Retrieved May 1, 2013, from [http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/tanitim.asp?id=13](http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/tanitim.asp?id=13).
In order to understand the vision of DIB’s foreign activities, they should be examined together with the AKP’s foreign policy. First of all, it should be noticed that AKP’s foreign policy, according to the discourse party members used, is based on moral and humanitarian values. They argue that reason itself is not adequate in international relations unless it is supported with virtue, honor and the sacredness of human being. Therefore AKP states that all these values are the key motivators of their foreign policy and the Party accuses the developed, Western, modern world of lying only on reason and excluding these values (Sarkisyan görüşmesinden sonra 1915 mesaji, 2010). DIB is, for AKP, a way to show that Turkey does not seek for hard power only, but cares about human beings and their humanitarian needs. On the other hand, in AKP’s discourse, it is easily seen that the source of the morality and the value of the human being comes from the religion. That is to say, DIB is a suitable choice for conservative AKP to show that they accept human beings as sacred and serve them modestly. For instance Erdoğan points out the famine and despair in Somalia and criticizes the rest of the world because of their thirst for resources. Saying that Turkey does not perceive Somalian issue based on national interests, Erdoğan asks the ones who are indifferent to Somalia the question “which civilization are you a member of?, which faith do you belong to?” (Somali’ye Devlet Çıkarları Nazaryyla Bakmadık, 2011). The President of DIB Mehmet Görmez also criticizes the West because of their failure to see that the crisis in the world is not only economic or political, but moral as well. Religions, according to Görmez, can show the right way to the world to seek for a moral, conscientious, just and equal order. For Görmez, the guilty of the crisis is not the religion but the indifference to religion and its values. DIB in this context is everywhere to foster moral and humanitarian values for all without seeking any advantage (Prof. Dr. Mehmet Görmez Avrupa Konseyi Parlamenter Meclisi’ne Hitap Etti, 2011).

As a part of Turkey’s public diplomacy strategy, DIB not only tries to increase the prestige of Turkey, but also it intends to highlight the indifference of the rest of the world. While the literature on the resurgence of religion has already started to expand, DIB with what it is doing indicates what the others are not doing because of their ignorance of religious values. While faith is about to return to the politics, as some feel threatened and some are pleased, for AKP, it is crucial to give an ear to the people who care about keeping the authenticity of their religion, the religious education of their children, the solidarity of their community etc. DIB as the collateral of the government and KDK, functions as a metaphysical and moral complementary in foreign policy. DIB in this context restores and builds new mosques and places of worships, gives religious education all over the world as an indicator of, as Bekir Bozdağ, the Deputy Prime Minister says, the power of Turkish Republic with the Turkish nation behind. He mentions that Turks are maybe the only nation who cares about their places of worship so much and he is so proud of being a member of Turkish nation. For him, mosques are the deeds of a homeland and they are the indicators of freedom (Camiler Memleketin Silinmez Tapulardır, 2011). With the work DIB has done, it is said that DIB has a visible prestige outside of Turkey (TİKA Önemli Mesafe Kat Etti, 2011).

Even though AKP does not agree with this claim, it is mostly argued that AKP has a Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy. The aim of the paper is not to discuss whether it is true or not, yet it is obvious that AKP often refers to the historical and religious ties with the old Ottoman regions and they even introduce their campaigns as the fulfillment of a responsibility arising from history. Considering that religion was the main regulatory and social value in the Ottoman era and noticing that DIB is especially active in the old Ottoman regions, it is possible to say that DIB is also a means of consolidating power in
these regions with an empire-like vision. Likewise, Görmez says that “religion is the most crucial belonging that constitutes identity” (Din, Kimliği Oluşturan En Önemli Aidiyettir, 2012). That is to say, religious identity comes before the national identity just as in the Ottoman Empire. Davutoğlu similarly considers Sarajevo as a homeland to have an iftar in Ramadan (Bizim Ruhumuzun Sılası Saraybosna’dır, 2011). Again focusing on the old system in the Balkans which guaranteed freedom of religion during the Ottoman era, Görmez states that it should be deeply contemplated how the old system were working well and how the current one is not. Görmez also mentions the constraints on the Muslim populations in the Balkans in his speech he delivered in 5th Meeting for the Presidents of Religious Affairs in Balkan States (Diyanoet İşleri Başkani Prof. Dr. Mehmet Görmez, Balkan Ülkeleri Diyanet İşleri Başkanları 5. İstişare Toplantısı’nda Konuştu: “Vakıf mallarının işgali kabul edilemez”, 2011).

In AKP’s foreign policy vision, the world is not divided into states since the borders are perceived as meaningless and artificial. The new motto of Ministry of Foreign Affairs is “there is no diplomacy of line but a diplomacy of zone. That zone is the entire globe”.

According to AKP’s foreign policy, Turkey should be globally omnipresent and omnipotent. While this vision comprises the interest in the old Ottoman regions, it also makes all activities in foreign lands legitimate. If the whole world is subject to AKP’s foreign policy, then the question what Turkey is doing for example in Africa becomes irrelevant. Africa is not farther than the Balkans or Middle East in the eyes of AKP and wherever there are people in need, Turkey’s helping hand would be there. DIB also believes that there are no borders that can prevent them from helping people. Since the whole world and all people were created by the one and the same God, then one should not distinguish between the borders and the people. Humanitarian aid campaigns to Somalia and other African countries, Arakan and other Asian countries are the signs of this vision. DIB not only raises donations for these regions but also ensures that a considerable amount of the donations are used for the religious services. Erdoğan states that Turkey’s helping hand is everywhere regardless of distance and all state institutions, including DIB, are actively participating in the campaigns because “we are the servants of the same God” and “our prayers are the same” (Başbakan Erdoğan’ın AK Parti’nin 10. Yıl Kutlamalarında Yaptığı Konuşmanın Tam Metni, 2011).

DIB is also actively in connection with the Turks abroad especially in Europe. This is again an attitude which points out that AKP and its public diplomacy strategy privileges own people above the nation-states borders. It is known that Turkish people living in Europe are generally conservative and care for the religious services. DIB tries to create a connection with the Turks abroad to teach Islam and Turkish-Islamic culture especially to the ones who were born outside of Turkey and so that they should be a moral model in the society they live (TİKA Önemli Mesafe Kat Etti, 2011).

AKP perceives Turkey as a member of the Islamic world. It does not mean that AKP’s foreign policy concentrates only on Islamic geography. Yet, looking at the discourse the party members use, it is easily seen that AKP perceives “civilization” as a key concept, even as an actor, in international relations, and positions Turkey inside the Islamic

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5 He describes the Ottoman system in his speech without giving direct reference to the word “Ottoman”.
6 Hattı diplomasi yoktur, sathıdiplomasivardır. O satıhbütündünyadır.
7 YTB has the same vision as well. Their motto is “wherever there is a citizen, cognate, relative of ours, we are there”. Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluuklar Başkanlıgı. (2013). Retrieved May 1, 2013, from http://www.ytb.gov.tr/
civilization. In the foreign policy discourse of AKP, states which have Muslim populations are Turkey’s friends and even relatives and brothers, and it is a must for the states belonging to same civilization to act together in order to stand strong in world politics. Considering that AKP wants to make Turkey first a regional and then a global power, it is inevitable that the role for Turkey in Islamic geography should be a “model state.” DIB in this picture is again quite active in the regions with Muslim populations in a way that trying to surpass the other alternatives and creating nearly a monopoly with the services they offer. Since Turkey is the only secular and modern state in a Western sense among the other states with Muslim populations, DIB represents a more modest and smiling face of a moderate Islam. As it is discussed in the 8th Meeting of Eurasian Islamic Council in 2012, “Turkey is the center of the Islamic world” and so Turkey should act accordingly. In the same meeting, it was announced that a Eurasian Islamic University will be founded and a General Secretary of the Eurasian Islamic Council will be established. What is significant is both of them will be located in Istanbul which is the cultural capital of the strongest Islamic state. Plus, considering that the services DIB provides are generally based on education and humanitarian affairs, this religious institution of modern and strong Turkey does not pose any danger to foreign societies such as oppressing them under radical Islamic rules.

Conclusion

DIB is a state institution and therefore it is not a surprise to see that it acts in parallel with the government’s policies inside and outside of Turkey. Yet this was not the case before AKP came into power in 2002. AKP has changed or enhanced the function of DIB as the Party discovered the significance of public diplomacy. Now DIB is one of the most important institutions of Turkish foreign policy which aims to make Turkey a soft power at least in its region conducting a religious diplomacy.

To summarize the points raised above, first of all, DIB is a loyal team member of foreign service carried by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Ministry. DIB and other state/government institutions organize joint conferences and organizations, and they host each other in order to manifest that they share a similar vision. DIB functions in a way to ensure that Turkey does not sacrifice its cultural and religious values to enjoy hard power but cares about human beings and their humanitarian needs. As a part of Turkey’s public diplomacy strategy, DIB not only serve the prestige of Turkey, but also it seeks to highlight the ignorance of the rest of the world to show the difference between conscientious Turkey and the others. DIB is again active in the old Ottoman regions to serve people Turkey has historical and religious ties as a part of AKP’s vision of foreign policy. Since borders are not absolute but imagined in AKP’s foreign policy, DIB does not distinguish between the borders and peoples to lend a helping hand. DIB also creates ties with the Turks abroad to teach Turkish-Islamic culture especially to the ones who were not born in Turkey. Lastly, DIB functions as a means to support that Turkey is a part of the Islamic world and is maybe the most powerful one among the states with Muslim populations.

Yet it should be noted that this paper does not aim to affirm the connection between Turkish foreign policy and DIB. The purpose is just to point out this new cooperation and its theoretical base in international relations literature. To decide whether this cooperation will be fruitful or not in the long run is not among the objectives of this paper.
References


